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Introduction
Although more Colombians are obtaining
university degrees than just ten years ago, Colom-
bia’s higher education1 system urgently requires
reform. As Colombia moves toward becoming a
more active member of the global economy, it
must keep pace with the rapidly changing world,
shifting the focus of its tertiary education sys-
tem by emphasizing education and training in
such high-demand areas as natural resources,
engineering, life sciences, retail trade, and finance
(Baracaldo). In 2010, the Santos administration
announced an education reform plan with a
goal of increasing public university access from
35 percent to 50 percent of high school graduates.
However, this reform was met with protests and
student strikes; students and university leaders
alike found the president’s proposed reform unac-
ceptable. They believed it put too much empha-
sis on technical training for the sake of the work
force and not enough on learning for the sake
of learning (Guzmán).
Outside the borders of the country, the
World Bank attempted to aid the country’s
struggling higher education program through
a loan in the amount of $200 million2 during
the period 2002–2008, specifically to be put
towards tertiary education (World Bank, 2009).
As a result of this loan—and with the incep-
tion of Acceso con Calidad a la Educación Supe-
rior (Quality Access to Higher Education),
henceforth called the Access Project—the total
number of students enrolling in tertiary educa-
tion increased by 30 percent, the number of
Ph.D. students tripled, and the percentage of
low-income students receiving educational
loans increased from 30 percent (of all loan
recipients) to nearly 70 percent (World Bank,
2009) between 2002 and 2008. More specifically,
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the World Bank’s assessment of the country’s
tertiary education quality had focused on two
points: enrollment demand at accredited uni-
versities and faculty research. The former saw
an increase over the loan period (2002–2008),
which meant that competition for financial sup-
port and general academic opportunities also
increased, thereby raising the quality of the
institution. The latter, faculty research, can be
numerically measured to show how the loan
improved quality in tertiary education. From
2002 to 2010, the portion of faculty holding
Ph.D.s increased from 2.9 percent to 4.1 per-
cent, total faculty size expanded by 32.6 percent,
and the portion of full-time faculty grew from
23.7 percent to 30.1 percent (World Bank, 2012).
In spite of these improvements, as of 2011, only
three of Colombia’s 125 universities were rec-
ognized among the top 600 universities in the
world. Consequently, while more Colombian
students than ever before are given the oppor-
tunity to attend college, the quality of education
they are receiving is not comparable to that
available abroad (U.S. News. “World’s Best
Universities: Top 400”).
Education is the foundation on which a
modern, industrialized country must be built.
Without a strong system to educate its citizens,
a country cannot experience sustained eco-
nomic growth and higher living standards. In
this article, I look at the history of higher edu-
cation in Colombia and how it is faced with a
decision that will have an impact for years to
come. I also discuss the need for stronger uni-
versity programs along with the potential
adverse consequences if Colombia does not
manage to improve the quality of its higher edu-
cation system. One of the crucial issues at the
heart of the struggle between the academic
community and the Santos administration to
form a bipartisan reform plan is how to improve
the quality of Colombia’s tertiary education so
that its workers are competitive with those from
more developed countries.
The Importance of Higher Education
Although it is a commonly accepted prin-
ciple that the more educated a person is the bet-
ter off he or she will be, for a government to
overhaul an entire higher education system
there needs to be indisputable evidence proving
that the benefits of such a reform outweigh
the costs. If the Colombian government is to
change its country’s higher education system,
it must first know why it is worthwhile to do so.
That said, the benefits of a higher education
degree can be analyzed from the point of view
of the individual as well as from the perspec-
tive of society.
Probably most important is that the advan-
tages of attending higher education do not
end with a larger paycheck. Although the aver-
age college graduate with a bachelor’s degree in
the United States makes a lifetime salary 46.9
percent higher than that of an average high
school graduate, men and women who have
graduated from a college or university also tend
to be more active in society (Baum et al.).
They are more likely to participate in public
activities, put their children in extracurricular
activities, and enjoy their careers than their less-
educated peers. In short, holders of a college
degree are richer, happier, and more sociable
than those without a college degree.
In the United States in 2009, the economic
recession hit its nadir, and every sector of
society felt the impact. Nevertheless, college
graduates experienced a lower unemployment
rate than both high school graduates and aver-
age Americans: the unemployment rate for
college graduates aged 25 or older was 4.6
percent whereas that rate for high school grad-
uates was 9.7 percent and the national average
unemployment rate was 7.9 percent. Other eco-
nomic differences include a 4 percent poverty
rate for college graduates versus a 12 percent
poverty rate for high school graduates, health
insurance coverage for 68 percent of college
graduates as opposed to 50 percent for high
school graduates, an 8 percent participation rate
in the Food Stamp Program for high school
graduates compared with 1 percent for college
graduates, and a higher presidential voting rate
by 32 percentage points for college graduates
than high school graduates between the ages of
25 and 44 (Baum et al.).
A college degree not only improves the
lives of those who obtain the degree but also
improves the society in which the degree-
holders participate. If the Colombian govern-
ment is able and willing to dedicate additional
national resources toward reforming its higher
education system, it should be able to reap the
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benefits in the long run. In the United States,
federal and state governments already know the
worth of investing in higher education, for it has
been shown that they earn $10 for every $1 they
put into higher education (Blumenstyk).
Although Colombia may not immediately expe-
rience these sorts of rewards, over time and with
committed dedication from those involved in
the education reform process, college graduates
as well as the society as a whole eventually
benefit.
The Beginning of Colombian Higher
Education (pre-1819)
Colombian universities have existed since
the founding of the Universidad de Santo Tomás
in 1580, although at that time, the region now
known as Colombia was nothing more than a
Spanish colony. The Universidad de Santo
Tomás was established as a private university
and still functions as one today. This univer-
sity and others of its period were intended pri-
marily for the education of church clerics and
state officials, although colonial Spanish gentry
were also able to afford a university education.
The number of Spaniards attending universities
in the region was small compared to the total
population of the colony, but it was enough to
initiate the disparity between the upper and
lower classes of the country. The economic
and social gaps caused by educational differ-
ences have since grown into what is now a dom-
inant political, economic, and social issue.
Tertiary Education after the
Revolution (1819–1930)
After Simón Bolívar led Colombia to its
freedom in 1819 from Spain, the concept of ter-
tiary education became a topic for debate
between the conservative and liberal parties. The
former group—followers of Bolívar—believed
in keeping the higher education system reli-
gious and private, whereas the latter group sup-
ported secular public universities. Although the
dispute was never resolved, there were dis-
tinct periods in which one party had consider-
ably more control over the government than the
other. One such period was during the mid-
1860s, when the Universidad Nacional de
Colombia (UNC) (National University of Colom-
bia) was founded. This was the first public
university established in Colombia and coin-
cided with a period of liberal control of the 
government.
Shortly after the founding of the UNC, the
liberal party lost power and the Conservative
Republic was established. This Republic lasted
until 1930, during which time it oversaw and
implemented two major changes. Foremost was
the signing of an agreement with the Roman
Catholic Church in 1887, known today as the
Núñez Concordat, after the country’s presi-
dent of the time, Rafael Núñez. The Núñez Con-
cordat granted the Church political powers
within Colombia (Núñez). The second great
change overseen by the Conservative Republic
was a new Constitution in 1886, which also hap-
pened to be due in large part to Núñez (Froys-
land). These changes lasted until the worldwide
Great Depression of 1929.
An Attempt at Modernization
(1930s–1980s)
The 1930s saw several attempts to improve
Colombia’s higher education system. From 1934
to 1946, government funds to the UNC
increased more than tenfold, resulting in UNC’s
enrollment more than tripling from 1,159 to
3,673 students (Briceño). Additionally, new pro-
grams, such as agriculture, chemistry, econom-
ics, business administration, and architecture,
were added to the university’s curriculum.
Despite the political and life-threatening trou-
bles caused by La Violencia,3 the international
push toward modernization carried Colombia
into an era of a growing middle class that 
saw education as the most effective route for
moving up to a higher standard of living. This 
widespread realization led to the formation of
numerous new universities, which in turn
sparked higher education policies by the gov-
ernment to regulate higher education and to
promote study abroad programs beyond Colom-
bia’s borders (Briceño).
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3La Violencia was a period of massive political strife
within Colombia between the years 1946 and 1964. It began
when a conservative rose to the presidency in 1946 and used
that power to attack the liberals. This, along with the assas-
sination of a prominent liberal leader in 1948, began an 
18-yearlong period of violence during which over 200,000
Colombians died (Garavito et al.).
In order to bring an end to the blood-
shed of La Violencia, an agreement known as the
National Front was reached in 1957 between lib-
erals and conservatives and dictated that the
presidency would alternate between these two
parties every four years until 1974. During
this period, the country made an effort to
restructure higher education to meet its goals
of national development through economic
growth, akin to the trickle-down effect. To aid
in this goal, foreign allies (primarily the United
States under Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress
program) gave $25 million to Colombia for
higher education between 1960 and 1967
(Briceño).
In spite of these reforms to rid Colom-
bian universities of their more traditional
aspects and refocus them on growing the coun-
try’s economy, university professors and stu-
dents consistently opposed any changes.
Throughout the 1960s, university professors and
students gained strength against the National
Front, leading to the Crisis of 1971, the cli-
max of the university movement against the
National Front’s education reforms, at which
point higher education activities all but
ceased—nearly all higher education establish-
ments shut down in protest of the government’s
attempts at change. The Crisis evolved from a
clash among three different perspectives on
higher education at the time. Of these, the
first came from powerful national groups that
pushed for changing higher education to sup-
port national businesses. The second came from
the middle class, who desired equality and jus-
tice in Colombia as well as in the country’s pub-
lic universities. The third came from a much
smaller segment of society who believed in
restructuring the entire Colombian government
but were so few in number they had no influ-
ence on the debate between the country’s
national groups and middle class (Briceño).
The effects of the Crisis were so widespread
that primary and secondary school teachers and
students, as well as workers and members of the
lower class, went on strike. The main conflict
was focused on finding a way to modernize the
higher education system when there were mul-
tiple opinions on what it meant to modernize.
Although the Crisis eventually died out
and students and professors went back to work,
no real solution to the problem was offered until
the Reform of 1980 (formally referred to as
Decrees 80 to 84), which was responsible for
introducing a legal framework to assist in reg-
ulating higher education. The most important
feature of this reform was that it divided post-
secondary education into four separate areas:
technical-professional, technologic, univer-
sity, and advanced/graduate education. These
areas continue to define the different seg-
ments of higher education in Colombia today
(Briceño).
Recent History: Law 30 (1990s)
The next major reform in Colombia’s his-
tory occurred in 1992, when reforms were put
in place in many different areas of national
importance. Law 30, which was part of this
reform, made several changes to the structure
of the higher education system in Colombia,
including the creation of different fields of
study—humanities, philosophy, technical, tech-
nology, science, and arts—at both the under-
graduate and graduate levels. Under Law 30,
all programs offered by any higher education
institution in Colombia were required to be clas-
sified under one of these fields of study (“Orga-
nization of Higher Education in Colombia:
Act 115 of 1994”). In addition, under Law 30,
degrees could only be awarded by institutions
recognized by the Ministry of Education. Stu-
dents also had to first obtain a high school
diploma to enter an institution of higher edu-
cation. Article 69 of the law made universities
autonomous, and Articles 28 through 30 further
specified the rights of the universities, includ-
ing the freedom to create academic programs,
to institute a system for hiring/keeping/firing
professors, and to manage their own funds
(Oviedo León).
Along with these specific changes, the
passing of Law 30 foreshadowed an increase in
the availability of tertiary education across 
all income quintiles.4 Colombia has always
struggled with socioeconomic inequality; for
example, in 2010, the poverty rate was lower
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4The first income quintile is the poorest 20 percent
of society, and the fifth income quintile is the richest 20 per-
cent of society. The intermediate quintiles increase in
income from the first quintile to the fifth. This is the cat-
egorization most commonly used when dividing Colombia’s
population by economic standing.
than it had ever been and was still at 37.2 per-
cent of the total population (World Bank.
“Colombia”). Law 30 was passed with the hope
that an increase in tertiary education avail-
ability would decrease the income gap between
the different social classes. Unfortunately, this
has not been the result. As more students pro-
gressed through secondary education, more ter-
tiary institutions were created to support the
growing demand from high school graduates.
However, these students were almost entirely
from the upper and middle classes of society,
and, as a result, the level of education between
the highest and lowest income quintiles actu-
ally widened. For example, the difference
between higher-education “coverage” of the first
and fifth income quintiles actually increased
from 1992 (the year Law 30 was passed) to 1997.
“Coverage” is used to mean the number of
persons (generally between the ages of 18 and
24) able to attend higher education if they 
so choose and is synonymous with “availabil-
ity” (King et al.). The fifth quintile jumped 
from 23 percent to 40 percent coverage, whereas
the first quintile saw an improvement from 
2 percent to a little under 6 percent (World
Bank, 2003). Thus, although Colombia saw an
average annual increase in higher education
enrollment of 8.5 percent during the 1990s, that
increase was not reflected evenly across all
income quintiles.
Despite the overall growth in the num-
ber of higher-education institutions, coverage
of higher education in 2002 stood at only 20 per-
cent in Colombia, which meant that only 20 per-
cent of college-age Colombians could attend a
university if they wanted to do so. In compari-
son, the Latin American average hovered around
25 percent and that of all developed countries
was near 54 percent (World Bank, 2003).
Not only was Colombia still below average
in coverage but also attempts made in the 1990s
to increase the coverage of tertiary education
led to sacrifices in the quality of education. One
way to measure the level of quality in a higher-
education system is the number of professors at
a university who hold a Ph.D. degree rather than
a master’s or bachelor’s degree. If more uni-
versities and programs are created in a short
span of time—as was the case in Colombia
during the 1990s—then the density of profes-
sors with Ph.D.s decreases. This problem did not
exist solely in Colombia; Argentina, the Nether-
lands, Mexico, and Romania (among others)
all experienced a decline in education quality as
coverage increased.
Paired with this decrease in the density
of professors with Ph.D.s was the loss of many
of Colombia’s brightest and most qualified—
Ph.D. and master’s degree holders who made the
decision to work overseas instead of in Colom-
bia. This phenomenon has commonly been
referred to as the “brain drain” of the 1990s
(Villavicencio). These Colombians were thought
to have left the country because there were bet-
ter research opportunities abroad and because
within Colombia there was no guarantee of
long-term government research funding. Fur-
thermore, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionar-
ias de Colombia (FARC) (Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia), an active terrorist organ-
ization in Colombia, adversely affected the polit-
ical stability of the country during that time,
further encouraging the country’s elites to leave.
The instability associated with the FARC culmi-
nated in 1999 with the worst recession Colom-
bia had experienced in 60 years. Real GDP that
year fell by 4.5 percent, the unemployment rate
peaked at 20.4 percent in June of 2000, and a
full recovery took several years (Arias). As a
result, an estimated 100,000 potential stu-
dents did not attend tertiary education from
1999 to 2001 because they could not afford it.
Although Law 30 improved the coverage of
higher education in Colombia, a decade after the
law had been passed there was still much room
for growth, particularly in terms of the quality
of institutions of higher education.
The Crash of 1999 and Its Aftermath
The Colombian government was slow to
rebound from the crash of 1999. To support the
country’s tertiary education system, the World
Bank approved a project to distribute a loan of
$200 million on a quarterly basis from 2002
through 2008 via the Access Project, an organ-
ization founded to handle and distribute these
borrowed funds. The objectives of this project
were threefold. The first was to provide finan-
cial support for intellectually capable students
from underprivileged backgrounds, thereby
helping them attend higher-education programs
they would otherwise be unable to afford. Yet
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these programs would not be worth the money
if they were not of a sufficiently high quality.
Therefore, the second objective was to improve
the quality of tertiary education institutions
by providing funding for the following: gradu-
ate-level programs, research facilities, mas-
ter’s and doctoral programs for the brightest
Colombian students, and research professors’
salaries. The final goal of the project was to
make the national administrative systems and
organizations, which governed tertiary educa-
tion, more efficient (World Bank, 2009). Colom-
bia’s national higher education information sys-
tem, known as Sistema Nacional de Información
de la Educación Superior (SNIES) (National
Information System for Higher Education), was
updated to automatically obtain census infor-
mation. Furthermore, the process for an insti-
tution to become accredited was revised to
include SNIES as a primary evaluator. On the
international level, Colombia was selected by the
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cul-
tural Organization (UNESCO) to participate in
a project called Map of Higher Education in
Latin America and the Caribbean. Because of its
information system, Colombia was able to read-
ily provide statistics and data on higher edu-
cation in the country back to UNESCO (World
Bank, 2009).
The overall outcomes of this project were
a reduction in the brain drain between 2002 and
2008 and an increase in students from lower-
income quintiles receiving tertiary education.
From 2001 to 2009, college enrollment in
Colombia increased from 24.3 percent to 29.4
percent of college-age citizens. In response to
the second goal of the project, the percentage
of faculty members holding Ph.D.s increased
from 2.9 percent to 4.1 percent from 2002 to
2010, and the total faculty size increased by 32.6
percent. A more indirect way of measuring the
effects that the Access Project had on quality
is to observe the performance of graduates after
they leave school. It was reported by the World
Bank that students who had received loans to
attend a higher-education institution were, on
average, performing just as well in the labor
market as students who had not received loans.
This meant that poorer students who went
through the tertiary education system came out
at the same level as their wealthier peers (World
Bank, 2012).
From these data it can be seen that the
changes the Access Project intended to make
were indeed attained. By the end of the loan
period,5 in 2008, however, there was still need for
improvement in the quality of the higher-edu-
cation institutions available in Colombia. Still
more professors with Ph.D.s were needed in
academic institutions, and more funding was
necessary to improve the quality of education
at these schools. The World Bank project worked
toward these improvements by funding graduate
programs and graduate students to keep the
country’s most talented youth within its borders,
but there was a need for a more permanent fix
that did not rely on loans from external sources.
In order to push Colombia’s higher-education
system to a level where it could compete with
its neighbors, such as Brazil, Argentina, and most
of the industrialized world, further changes
needed to be made so that Colombia would be
capable of sustaining the resulting structure of
higher education on its own.
Tertiary Education in the Early 2000s
When Juan Manuel Santos became Presi-
dent in 2010, one of his proposed reforms
focused on higher education. His administra-
tion intended to update the most recent reform
law of 1992, Law 30, to modify higher education
so that it catered to industry. According to
student representatives, Santos’ reform would
not improve the quality of tertiary education
in Colombia. Instead, they say, it would simply
provide future workers for companies already
established in the country (Guzmán). Based
on data collected in 2012, the top university
in Colombia is the UNC, followed closely by
the Universidad de Antioquia, the Pontificia Uni-
versidad Javeriana, and the Universidad de los
Andes (“Universities in Colombia”). Only two of
these top Colombian universities, Universidad
de los Andes and UNC, were listed in the top
20 of all Latin American tertiary institutions
in 2011. In comparison, Brazil has eight univer-
sities in the top 20 in the Latin American region,
Chile has three, Argentina has five, and Mex-
ico has two (U.S. News. “World’s Best Univer-
sities: Latin America”).
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5 The $200 million was disbursed in portions between
the years 2002 and 2008.
Comparing Colombian universities to
other universities across the globe, as of 2011
Colombia only has three in the list of the top
600 universities in the world (UNC, Universidad
de Antioquia, and Universidad de los Andes). All
three of these universities rank between 500th
and 600th. Colombia is striving to become a
first-world country, but its higher-education
institutions do not reflect those efforts. Its
colleges and universities are not making an
impact at the international level.
The rankings presented above are an
appropriate indicator of the current quality of
the higher-education system in Colombia
because they are standards set at national,
regional, and international levels. What that
means for Colombia is that of all its universi-
ties, only a handful rank regionally. At any
higher level (Latin America or internation-
ally), Colombian institutions are barely notice-
able. This is the situation that President San-
tos was trying to improve with his 2010 reform
plan, which proposed to increase higher edu-
cation spending by $1.3 billion over the span
of three years (2011–2014). Of these planned
funds, $224 million were to go to institutions,
and $422 million to students as loans and sub-
sidies on a need-based system (Downie). This
would be in addition to the $3.2 billion put aside
for public institutions for the 2011 year.
In 2011, the proponents of Santos’ plan
believed it would increase the number of terti-
ary students from 1.6 million to 2.2 million by
2014, and many of these students were expected
to come from the lowest income quintiles.
Unfortunately, the plan was not well received by
the Colombian academic community. Many stu-
dents and academics believed that Santos’
reform plan would not only treat education like
a business but also be unable to achieve its
own goal. For example, the rector of the UNC,
Moisés Wasserman, doubted the government’s
ability to follow through with its proposals.
Wasserman pointed out that Santos’ plan would
attempt to increase the number of students by
38 percent yet increase the higher education
budget by only 16 percent (Downie). Students
grew agitated because of the government’s
inflexibility on the reform plan and went on
strike in the fall of 2011 to protest it. After
five weeks of student protests, a congressional
committee unanimously voted to end the
reform plan; it also agreed to begin work on a
novel education reform plan that would inte-
grate the demands of the students and profes-
sors into the government’s proposal (Wells).
As of September 2012, no progress had
been made by the government to work together
with the academic community on a new solu-
tion. Meanwhile, students are trying to put
together a plan that does not stop government
subsidies for their education. Many students and
professors also believe the government was vio-
lating the autonomy—a legal right provided
to them by Law 30—of their academic institu-
tions by trying to impose Santos’ plan the year
before (Alsema, 2012). Additionally, students
believe the Ministry of Education is not only
ignoring them but also continuing to propose a
plan similar to Santos’, one that does not
address their concerns (Alsema, 2012). As a
result, tens of thousands of students and profes-
sors once again went on strike during Sep-
tember 2012 and marched through the cities of
Colombia protesting the lack of effort by the
government to reach a compromise on the edu-
cation reform plan (Scott).
It is critical that a decision be reached soon
because the education system has major prob-
lems that need to be fixed. For example, the
average number of Ph.D. holders is 2.3 for every
million citizens, lower than almost every coun-
try in that area of the world (Mason). This sta-
tistic can be tied directly to the amount of fund-
ing distributed by the government to higher
education. Only 0.4 percent of Colombia’s
GDP is invested in higher education, com-
pared to the Latin American average of 1.2
percent (Mejía). When coupled with the fact that
the 2010 GDP of Colombia was 33rd highest
in the world and 5th highest in South Amer-
ica, it becomes clear that not enough money
is being spent on the tertiary education sys-
tem in Colombia. This lack of adequate funding
is the fundamental issue with which Colombian
students and professors are concerned, espe-
cially those from public universities where gov-
ernment funding is much more crucial (World
Bank. “Gross Domestic Product 2010”).
Not only is funding currently lower than
the regional average but also the reform pre-
sented by the Santos administration proposed
allowing public institutions to become funded
by private companies and allowing for-profit
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universities to be set up in the higher education
system. Currently, nonprofit private institutions
exist in Colombia and, according to the coun-
try’s former Minister of Education, Cecilia María
Vélez, these nonprofit private institutions are
more flexible and able to reach poorer sec-
tions of society than public institutions. During
her tenure as Minister of Education (2002–
2010), Ms. Vélez helped to expand the country’s
higher education system by helping to create
private institutions in locations where there was
insufficient funding for public institutions
(Sharma). In regard to Santos’ failed reform, she
believes that by allowing private companies to
invest in public education, poorer sections of
the population can be reached because of the
additional funding.
What students and academics fear is that
a sudden increase in the number of universities
will lead to a lower quality of education, espe-
cially if for-profit private universities and pri-
vate funding for public universities become
commonplace, as was the case with Brazil in the
1990s. The Brazilian government allowed for
private financing within higher education,
and that resulted in a rise in higher-education
student dropout rates (Downie), which is what
many Colombian students and academics
believe will happen in their country if Santos
has his way (Downie). Allowing private com-
panies to fund academic institutions is not the
direction the academic community wants the
reform to take. Instead, the academic commu-
nity believes education is a right that should
be provided to them by the government
(Alsema, 2011). Students and professors alike
are fearful of their public universities being
turned into degree-producing factories without
a genuine interest in the sharing of knowl-
edge. This scenario seems valid, because the
Santos administration planned to push the
reform law through regardless of their protests
in 2011. A student organization, Mesa Amplia
Nacional Estudiantil (MANE) (Comprehensive
National Student Board), was created in 2011 to
combat Santos’ reform plan and was largely
responsible for organizing the strikes that led
to a halt in the higher education reform process
(Bejarano).
Since that time, MANE and its young
leader Sergio Fernández have been pushing
for a plan they call their Minimum Program.
This plan possesses six core tenets that form the
foundation for the organization. For a new
MANE chapter to be established, that chapter
must accept the six-point plan. The first of these
points is financing. Based on the idea that
education is a human right and a necessity for
national development, MANE demands that the
government be able to financially support the
public higher education system without the
assistance of private investors. The student
organization suggests that this be done by
increasing taxes on foreign companies, such
as gold mining companies, that wish to use
Colombia’s natural resources. The second point
of the plan is autonomy and democracy. Latin
American higher education institutions com-
monly fall victim to influence from the private
sector, so that private companies have the power
to make decisions about the governance of pub-
lic universities. MANE is against this sort of pri-
vate sector influence and desires an institutional
democracy that involves students, faculty, and
staff of the university.
The third tenet is academic quality. Not
only does MANE seek to secure adequate financ-
ing for public institutions but also it is attempt-
ing to redefine the meaning of academic qual-
ity to fit the idea of social transformation.
University welfare is the fourth point of the Min-
imum Program and includes both the welfare
of the students and job security for campus
workers. MANE wants to make higher education
more accessible to poorer students and believes
the public universities should offer cheaper meal
plans, on-campus housing, transportation and
health services, and sport, cultural, and artis-
tic activities. The fifth tenet is democratic
freedoms for all students, faculty, staff, and
workers at public institutions, such as free-
dom of speech and freedom to organize. Finally,
the sixth point of the Minimum Program is uni-
versity society. MANE wants the university
system to be restructured to address the needs
of Colombian society, which suffers from a high
unemployment rate, fiercely segmented demo-
graphics, and an armed conflict between the
government and guerrilla groups (Suárez-
Boulangger).
When President Santos proclaimed his
2010 higher education reform plan, he unknow-
ingly sparked a rebellion that has managed to
halt his plan for higher education. While his
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plan has seen opposition, its intentions are for
the immediate good of Colombia. Both par-
ties, Santos’ administration and MANE, under-
stand that fixing Colombia’s higher education
system is what will lead to the country’s contin-
ued overall growth. What must be done now is
for the student and academic communities to
find harmony with the government and jointly
decide on a higher education reform plan that
best addresses the needs of the Colombian
higher education system.
Planning for the Future
The next few years will bring change to the
higher education system of Colombia, but the
question is what that change will be. Although
MANE’s six-point Minimum Program is well
intentioned, it is far from being implemented.
At the same time, if appropriate government
funding is not found to support those young
adults desiring to attend public university, then
Santos’ plan would become a more feasible solu-
tion. Despite many students presenting a uni-
fied front to the government and the Santos
administration agreeing to work with them,
there is still significant work to be done to reach
an agreement.
The longer it takes for a long-term plan to
be mutually agreed on and instituted, the harder
it will be for Colombia to continue its climb
toward becoming a legitimate first-world coun-
try. But I believe that putting in the effort
now to find a compromise between Santos’ plan
and MANE’s Minimum Program will perma-
nently benefit Colombia’s youth, hence Colom-
bia itself. 
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